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German Perspective on OGH 4 Ob 8 /11x
THOMAS THIEDE*
The Austrian Case OGH 4 Ob 8/11x serves brilliantly as a starting point for 
revisiting the German doctrine covering actions in cases where the right o f  contact 
o f one parent is violated by the other parent as two entirely different foundations 
for such actions may apply: breach o f  a legal duty and, o f  course, a general action 
in tort.
A  quick diversion to explain the form er (originally merely contractual) action 
may bring clarity: as the original general law o f obligations in the German Civil 
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) at the time o f enactment in 1900 recognized 
only two types o f contractual breach (non-perform ance and delay), cases o f  simple 
m isperform ance could not be handled thoroughly.1 Accordingly, the courts quite 
quickly adopted a third category where the main duty was m isperform ed or 
additional secondary obligations were violated (positive Forderungsverletzung).2 In 
order to establish such a claim, some kind o f contractual or legal obligation must 
have existed, stipulating a duty that was violated as a result o f culpable behaviour 
by the other party to the obligation.
A ccording to a judgm ent o f  the German Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) rendered in 2002 in a case where the costs incurred by 
the claimant in order to visit his child were frustrated by the custodial parent, this 
very concept was applied.3 The legal obligation necessary was deduced from  section 
1634 paragraph 1 BGB obs,4 determining that the child has the right to contact with 
each parent and, correspondingly, each parent has a right o f  contact with the child. 
In the view o f  the BG H , there is a legal duty rooted in family law between both 
parents allowing for  visitation and contact — which in addition is shaped by the 
second paragraph o f that provision that provides that each parent must refrain 
from  anything that renders the relationship o f  the child to the other parent more
* Dr. iur., L L.B ., LL.M ., Institute for  European Tort Law, Austrian Academy o f Sciences; European 
Centre o f Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL).
1 See F. W IEACKER, A History o f  Private Law in Europe (translated by T. W eir), OUP, Oxford 
1995, p. 412; H. STAUB, Die positiven Vertragsverletzungen und ihre Rechtsfolgen, Festschrift fü r  
den XXVI. Deutschen Juristentag, Guttentag, Berlin 1902, p. 29; for  further explanations, see B. 
MARKESINIS et al., The German Law o f  Obligations, vol. I, Clarendon, Oxford 1997, pp. 418 
et seq .
2 In the meantime, the concept has been added to the BGB and comes under sec. 280 para. 1: ‘ I f the 
obligor breaches a duty arising from  the obligation, the obligee may demand damages for  the 
damage caused thereby.’
3 BGH 19 Jun. 2002, BGHZ (Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen) 151, 155.
4 Now sec. 1684 BGB.
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difficult (good  conduct clause) — o f which the child is the beneficiary. As the costs 
resulting from  the exercise o f  the right to contact are to be borne by the parent 
incurring them,5 the legal relationship between both parents includes — in the best 
interest o f  the child — the obligation o f both parents to take regard o f the economic 
situation o f the other parent and to avoid extra expenses, which would lead to a 
frustration o f that right in the future.6 Any breach o f this obligation would justify 
an action for damages that could result commonly though not invariably in 
pecuniary damages. As the other parent intentionally created additional costs by 
frustrating the costs o f  visitation, the claimant was awarded his additional costs to 
see his child .7 However, this case was the only instance where the concept o f  positive  
Forderungsverletzung  was invoked and was met with reluctance, as it would also 
entitle the custodial parent waiting for  the visit to damages for  frustrated expenses — 
and apparently a m ajority o f  parents who have a right to visit simply do not observe 
such rights. M oreover, among other questions,8 it seems rather unclear whether a 
parent would also be entitled to compensation for  pain and suffering under that 
heading.9
Obviously the m ore straightforward solution would be to deal with such 
claims resulting from  the violation o f  the right to contact under the general tort law 
clause o f section 823 paragraph 1 BGB as the enumerated interests and rights 
contained therein cover not only the health o f the victim but residually includes any 
‘ other right’ (sonstiges R ech t), which is deemed worthy o f  protection. Under the 
first heading any adverse interference with the person, in particular, externally 
provoked psychological disturbances o f  the kind suffered by the claimant here,
5 BGH 9 Nov. 1994, FamRZ (Zeitschrift fü r  das gesamte Familienrecht) 1995, 215; OLG 
(Oberlandesgericht, Higher Regional Court) FRANKFURT Main, NJW-RR (Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift — R echtsprechungsreport) 2005, 1339.
6 BGH 9 Nov. 1994, FamRZ  1995, 215; OLG HAMM 27 Jun. 2003, FamRZ  2004, 560; see also 
B V erfG  (Bundesverfassungsgericht, German Federal Constitutional Court) 5 Feb. 2002, NJW  
2002, 1863; OLG ZW EIBRÜCKEN 28 Jul. 1998, FamRZ  1998, 1465.
7 See references in n. 6 and OLG KARLSRUHE 21 Dec. 2001, FamRZ  2002, 1056; AG (Amtsgericht, 
District Court) GÜTERSLOH 19 Mar. 1997, FamRZ  1998, 576; AG ESSEN, 17 Dec. 1999, FamRZ 
2000, 1110; G. HOHLOCH, ‘ Schadensersatz bei Verletzung des Umgangsrechts’ , FF (Forum  
Familienrecht) 2004, 202, at 207; D. HENRICH, ‘Anmerkung zu BGH 9.6.2002’ , JZ 
(Juristenzeitung) 2003, 49; I. RAKETE-DOM BEK, ‘ Schadenersatz bei Nichtgewährung des 
familiengerichtlich geregelten Umgangsrechts’ , FF  2002, 210, at 212.
8 For example, whether the child to be visited is entitled to damages if the parent fails to visit. See the 
critical appraisal by T. RAUSCHER, Familienrecht, C.F. Müller, Heidelberg 2nd edn 2008, no. 
1098; D. W EYCHARD, ‘Anmerkung BGH 19.6.2002’ , FamRZ  2003, 927; B. HEIDERHOFF, 
‘ Schuldrechtliche Ersatzansprüche zwischen Eltern bei Verletzungen des Umgangsrechts?’ , FamRZ  
2004, 324, at 325; D. SCHWAB, ‘ Gemeinsame elterliche Verantwortung - ein Schuldverhältnis?’ , 
FamRZ  2002, 1297, at 1300; I. RAKETE-DOM BEK, supra  n. 7, p. 212.
9 See LG (Landgericht, County Court) ESSEN 17 Dec. 2007, FamRZ  2008, 2032; AG ESSEN 5 Jun. 
2007, FamRZ  2008, 717, at 718 = NJOZ (Neue Juristische Online Zeitschrift) 2008, at 1167.
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would be covered. Psychiatric in jury is, clearly, in jury to health in the sense of 
section 823 paragraph 1 BG B, as long as it entails medically recognizable physical 
or psychological consequences that would have been suffered by the ordinary, not 
over-sensitive, citizen.10 For the second heading, ‘ other right’ has always been 
understood to mean that the rights and interests protected by this formulation must 
be absolute rights, that is, rights can be asserted against everyone (rights in rem ).11 
It is good law that the right to visit in section 1684 BGB is such an absolute right, 
which can be maintained not only against third parties but also against the other 
parent to a ch ild .12
The difficult question regarding a claim for  damages for  this type of 
psychiatric illness w ould then be whether the defendant parent’s conduct played a 
sufficient role in bringing about his violation o f rights and interest or, in short, 
whether the conduct was causally connected to the harm inflicted. Under German 
law, three different concepts are used to determine whether particular conduct led 
to the victim ’s harm. First, the but-for test (conditio sine qua non) would ask 
whether the victim ’s harm would have occurred but for  the defendant’s condu ct.13 
The obvious answer in the case at hand would be in the affirmative. However, such 
im peccable logic yields a potentially infinite num ber o f  causes for  any given harm ,14 
and thus, even the original procreation o f the child (or indeed o f the parents and 
their parents) w ould be a sufficient cause for  the claimant’s eventual psychiatric 
illness. As a consequence, German courts concur that further criteria must be laid 
down in order to prevent such infinite expansion o f attribution o f harm. Such a 
restrictive criterion is applied when assessing the adequacy (Adaquanz) o f  a
10 Consistent case law, cf. BGH 11 Jan. 1972, BGHZ  58, at 48 et seq. = NJW  1972, at 1126; BGH 5 
Feb. 1985, BGHZ  93, 351, at 355 et seq. = NJW  1985, 1390 et seq.; BGH 6 Jun. 1989, BGHZ  107, 
359, at 363; BGH 30 Apr. 1996, BGHZ  132, 341, at 344 = NJW  1996, 2425; BGH 11 Nov. 1997, 
BGHZ  137, 142, at 145 et seq. = NJW  1998, 810; BGH 22 May 2007, BGHZ  172, 263; OLG K öln 
29.7.1999, NJW-RR 2000, 760; OLG Hamm 2 Apr. 2001, NJW-RR 2001, 1676.
11 Cf. H. SPRAU in ‘ Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’ , 70th edn, C.H. Beck, München 2011, sec. 
823 no. 11.
12 BGH 24 Apr. 1990, BGHZ  111, 168 = NJW  1990, at 2060; OLG F ra n k fu rt am Main 29 Apr. 2005, 
NJW-RR 2005, at 1339; OLG K arlsru h e 21 Dec. 2001, FamRZ  2002, at 1056, RAUSCHER, supra 
n. 8, no. 956; U. DIEDERICHSEN, in Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, C.H. Beck, München 
70th edn 2011, sec. 1626 no. 2; L.M. PESCHEL-GUTZEIT in J. von Staudingers Kom m entar zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. IV, Sellier-de Gruyter, Berlin 14th edn 2007, sec. 1626 no. 20; H.-W. 
STRÄTZ, in Soergel, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, vol. 19, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 13th edn 2002, sec. 
1626 no. 4 ; L. MICHALSKI in Erman, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, vol. II, Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 
12th edn 2008, sec. 1626 no. 1.
13 BGH 11 May 1951, BGHZ  2, 138, at 141 = NJW  1951, at 711; BGH 2 Jul. 1957, BGHZ  25, 86, at 88 
= NJW  1957, at 1475; BGH 24 Oct. 1985, BGHZ 96, 157, 172 = NJW  1986, at 576; BGH 4 Jul. 
1994, NJW  1995, 126, at 127.
14 C. VON BAR, Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht, vol. II, C.H. Beck, München 1999, no. 437; G. 
BRÜGGEM EIER, Haftungsrecht: Strukturen, Prinzipien, Schutzbereich, Springer, Berlin/New 
York 2006, 28; C. VAN DAM, European Tort Law, OUP, Oxford 2006, pp. 286 et seq.
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‘ bu t-for ’ cause: I f  even a particularly well-informed and careful person would not 
have anticipated the harmful result as a likely possibility the person responsible 
under the csqn  criterion should not be held liable.15 Again our answer would be in 
the affirm ative, as it is likely that a parent who is denied the chance to visit his or 
her child will suffer mentally. Third , one may then refer to the concept o f  the 
protective purpose o f  the rule in question (Schutzzweck der N orm ), postulating that 
there should be no attribution i f  the harm is not within the scope o f the rule in 
question, that is, not the m isconduct that the statute was designed to prevent.16 The 
wording o f section 1684 paragraph 1 BGB stipulates that the parent’s right o f 
contact with his or her child grants the claimant an absolute right also against the 
other parent. This absolute right does not seem to envisage only pecuniary interests 
— the protection o f  which, as we have seen, has been accepted — but all the m ore the 
purely non-pecuniary interest in having contact with the child. That the violation o f 
a protected non-pecuniary interest could result in non-pecuniary harm and, hence, 
falls under the protective purpose o f  the norm violated seems to be self-evident from  
this perspective.
I f  the argument o f the direct applicability o f section 1684 BGB to the 
claimant is rejected and, accordingly, he is depicted (only) as a secondary victim 
(with the ‘ non-visited’ child as the prim ary victim ), one may also deduce arguments 
from  the so-called shock-damage cases and the concept o f  psychological causation 
(psychische K ausalität):17 The crucial point for  such line o f  argument is that 
refusing the right to contact did not directly inflict the harm but rather did so 
indirectly. To some extent com parable with Austria, it is good law that secondary 
(shock) victims can claim damages i f  they suffer from  a significant reaction to the 
events. This is regularly the case i f  this reaction amounts to a recognized 
pathological illness, that is, psychological disturbances with amounts to a somatic 
illness.18 As a parent is sufficiently close19 to his child and the rejection o f the visit 
amounted to an in jury to health, one may suggest that the defendant would be held
15 BGH 23 Oct. 1951, BGHZ  3, 261, at 266; BGH 18 Nov. 1957, BGHZ  26, 69, at 76 = NJW 1958, at 
341; BGH 19 Nov. 1971, BGHZ  57, 245, at 255 = NJW 1972, at 195; BGH 26 Jun. 1972, BGHZ  59, 
139, at 144 = NJW 1972, at 1943; BGH 3 Feb. 1976, NJW  1976, 1143, at 1144; BGH 16 Apr. 2002, 
NJW  2002, 2232, at 2233.
16 E. RABEL, Recht des Warenkaufs, vol. I (re-print), de Gruyter, Berlin 1957, pp. 495 et seq ., 502 et 
seq.; BGH 19 Nov. 1957, BGHZ  57, 245, at 256 = NJW 1972, at 195; BGH 25 Mar. 2003, NJW  2003, 
1929, at 1930.
17 BGH 13 Jul. 1971, BGHZ  57, 25, at 29 = NJW  1971, at 1980; BGH 4 Jul. 1994, NJW  1995, 126, at 
127; BGH 17 Oct. 2000, NJW  2001, 512, at 513; BGH 16 Apr. 2002, NJW  2002, 2232, at 2233.
18 BGH 11 May 1971, BGHZ  56, 163, at 165 = NJW  1971, 1883; N. ADELMANN, ‘ Schmerzensgeld 
wegen des Miterlebens der schweren Verletzung oder Tötung eines anderen im Straßenverkehr’ , 
VersR (Zeitschrift fü r  Versicherungsrecht, Haftungs- und Schadensrecht) 2009, pp. 449 et seq.
19 BGH 22 May 2007, BGHZ  172, 263 et seq. =  NJW 2007, 2764; ADELMANN, supra  n. 18, pp. 449 et 
seq .
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liable not due to the violation o f the right to visit but due to the infringement to 
health suffered by the claimant.
Finally, one may also draw an analogy to awards o f non-pecuniary damages 
in cases o f invasion o f personality rights. As the text o f  BGB is limited in that 
regard, the BGH referred to the protection enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 o f  the 
German Constitution (G rundgesetz, G G ).20 It held that the Constitution, in its 
express desire to protect human dignity and personality, makes the extension o f this 
civil remedy both desirable and necessary. Any elimination o f damages from  the 
protection of personality w ould mean that the in jury to the dignity and honour 
w ould remain without the sanction o f the civil law and thereby the strongest and 
often only instrument to ensure respect for  the personal worth o f the individual 
w ould be frustrated. This, however, will only be the case when the tortfeasor can be 
blamed for  gross fault or when the in jury is objectively significant; only when such 
disturbances are serious may the civil law react against the in jury by granting 
satisfaction to the person affected.21 A nd indeed, not only human dignity and 
personality are guaranteed by the German Constitution but also parental rights: 
Article 6 paragraph 2 GG provides that ‘ [t]he care and upbringing o f children is the 
natural right o f  parents and a duty primarily incum bent upon them’ . According to 
case law, section 1684 BGB is a substantiation o f this fundamental right.22 
Correspondingly, the exercise o f the right to visit as a fundamental right w ould 
remain toothless if  non-pecuniary damages were not awarded. As the additional 
prerequisite o f gross fault on the part o f the defendant seems to be fulfilled in the 
case at hand, one may conclude that the express desire o f the Constitution to protect 
the parent’s right of care and upbringing o f their children makes this imperative the 
extension o f a civil remedy, which is appropriate to the nature of the harm suffered 
and intended to be protected by the right.
One may conclude that com parable case law to the O G H ’s judgm ent in 
favour o f a civil remedy — either due to a positive Forderungsverletzung  or on the 
basis o f  section 823 paragraph 1 BGB — is likely to be o f  only marginal im pact. This 
is due to three reasons: first, the psychological disturbances suffered by the 
claimant parent must amount to a recognized pathological somatic illness, which 
rarely seems to be the case.23 Second, other judicia l remedies, such as rem oval of
20 BGH 14 Feb. 1958, BGHZ  26, 349; BGH 1 Oct. 1996, NJW  1997, 1152; BGH 5 Dec. 1995, NJW  
1996, 984; BGH 1 Dec. 1999, NJW  2000, 2201; BGH 26 Oct. 2006, NJW  2007, 689; BVerfG 8 Mar. 
2000, NJW  2000, 2187; BVerfG 22 Aug. 2006, NJW  1006, 3409; T. THIEDE, Internationale 
Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzungen, Jan Sramek, Wien 2010, no. 2, pp. 49 et seq.
21 BGH 19 Sep. 1961, BGHZ  35, 363 = NJW  1961, 1059; BGH 15 Nov. 1994, NJW  1995, 861; BGH 1 
Dec. 1999, BGHZ  2000, 2201; BGH 25 Feb. 1969, NJW  1969, 1110; BGH 17 Mar. 1970, NJW  1970, 
1077.
22 B V erfG  31 May 1983, NJW  1983, 2491; B V erfG  5 Nov. 1980, BVerfGE (Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts), 55, 171, at 178.
23 See the decision o f AG ESSEN, supra  n. 9.
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parental custody,24 the withdrawal o f  maintenance payments25 or even fines26 are 
m ore in the focus o f  judicia l review as claimants are m ore likely to seek the 
establishment o f  real contact with their child rather than damages for their 
non-pecuniary loss. This reduces such remedies to a mere side-show o f the litigation 
process. Third , as bem oaned by practitioners, custody litigation and the subsequent 
litigation on the right to visit are apt to be faced with a boycott attitude o f one 
parent.27 It is open to doubt whether damages for  non-pecuniary loss would have 
any positive effect and thus would actually becom e a customary civil remedy in this 
field.
24 See sec. 1666 BGB: ‘ (1)Where the physical, mental or psychological best interests o f the child or its 
property are endangered and the parents do not wish or are not able to avert the danger, the family 
court must take the measures necessary to avert the danger. (2)In general it is to be presumed that 
the property o f the child is endangered if the person with care for the property o f the child violates 
his maintenance obligation towards the child or his duties connected with the care for  the property 
o f the child or fails to comply with orders o f the court that relate to the care for the property o f the 
child. (3)The court measures in accordance with subsection (1) include in particular: 1. instructions 
to seek public assistance, such as benefits o f child and youth welfare and healthcare, 2. instructions 
to ensure that the obligation to attend school is complied with, 3. prohibitions to use the family 
home or another dwelling temporarily or for  an indefinite period, to be within a certain radius of 
the home or to visit certain other places where the child regularly spends time, 4. prohibitions to 
establish contact with the child or to bring about a meeting with the child, 5. substitution of 
declarations o f the person with parental custody, 6. part or complete removal o f parental custody.’
25 Section 1570 BGB.
26 OLG R osto ck  29 Oct. 2001, FamRZ 2002, 967; OLG K arlsru h e 6 Aug. 1997, NJW-RR 1998, 939; 
OLG K arlsru h e  16 Dec. 2003, FamRZ  2005, 919; OLG C e lle  22 May 1998, FamRZ  1999, 173; 
OLG Zw eibrucken 9 Feb. 1998, FamRZ  1999, 173; OLG F rankfurt/M ain 11 Mar. 2003, 
<www.hefam.de/urteile/3WF21002.html>.
27 I. RAKETE-DOM BEK, supra  n. 7, p.212.
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